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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS1 BODY & PAINT, INC., a
Utah corporation, and BRYAN
CIIRISTENSEN,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 890540-CA
vs •
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
and LEON MAXWELL,
Defendants-Respondents

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

Plaintiffs bring this appeal

from the June 12, 1989 Order by the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding,
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company and Leon Maxwell, and dismissing with
prejudice plaintiffs' complaint against defendants.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' second cause of action for
defamation?

2.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' third cause of action for
tortious interference with business relations?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§45-2-3(3), 45-2-4,
and 76-9-506 (1953), Utah Insurance Department Regulation
R540-89-ll(H), and Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are
determinative on appeal.

The text of each provision is set forth

in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. and Bryan
Christensen, brought suit against defendants, State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company and Leon Maxwell, asserting three causes of
action:

violation of the Utah Anti-Trust Act, Utah Code Ann.

§76-10-911 et seq. (Supp. 1989), defamation and tortious interference with business relations.

On June 12, 1989, the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable James
S. Sawaya presiding, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of defendants and against
plaintiffs, no cause of action.

Plaintiffs now seek judicial

review of Judge Sawayafs June 12, 1989 Order.
This action arises out of the business relationship
between plaintiffs' automobile body repair shop, an automobile
liability insurer, State Farm, its employee, Leon Maxwell, and
various State Farm insureds and claimants.

Defendant State Farm

is in the business of insuring automobile owners and operators in

the State of Utah and in adjusting damage to its insureds' vehicles and vehicles damaged by its insureds' negligence.

At all

pertinent times, State Farm has utilized a market survey technique
to establish a prevailing competitive rate for repair work done by
automobile body shops in Salt Lake County.

R. 40-44.

Since the

amounts expended by State Farm to repair its insureds' and
claimants' vehicles forms a critical factor in setting State
Farm's automobile liability insurance rates in the State of Utah,
the use of prevailing competitive rate surveys protects and promotes State Farm's own economic interest, as well as the economic
interests of its insureds, by securing the most reasonable and
economical repair services available.

Id.

Plaintiffs' automobile body repair shop opened for business in August, 1976.

R. 138 at pp. 199-205, 242 at pp. 14-15.

During the first few years of plaintiffs' business, State Farm
insureds and claimants made up approximately 15-20% of plaintiffs'
business.

Ic3. During the majority of the 13 years of plaintiffs'

business, State Farm insureds and claimants have comprised
approximately 15-25% of plaintiffs' business.

I_d.

As can be

expected, the amount of repair work done by plaintiffs for any one
insurer, including State Farm, normally and customarily fluctuates
from time to time.

R. 238 at pp. 199-205, 242 at pp. 15-17.

During 1985, State Farm's Utah Division had 69,093
reported claims, in 1986 the number of reported claims declined
to 66,247, and in 1987 the number of reported claims continued to
decline to 65,847, more than a 4.7% decrease from 1985. R.

213-15.

During that same time period, plaintiffs performed 177

repairs for State Farm insureds/claimants in 1985 (.0025% of the
total available reported claims), 127 repairs in 1986 (.0019% of
the total available reported claims), and 93 repairs in 1987
(.0014% of the total available reported claims).

R. 238 at p. 201.

During the course of State Farm's dealings with
plaintiffs' repair shop, defendants have detected through their
marketing surveys that plaintiffs often charge more for their
services than their competitors, and often charge more than the
prevailing competitive rate, as determined by State Farm's
surveys.

R. 32-30, 96-106, 241 at pp. 80-81.
Over the course of the parties' dealings, State Farm and

State Farm's employees have been subjected to verbal abuse and
derision by plaintiffs.

R. 32-44, 96-110.

As a result of the

escalating difficulties between State Farm and plaintiffs, State
Farm was forced to implement a program designed to arrive at a
mutually-agreeable repair estimate.

R. 35-44, 103-06.

State Farm

adopted a program whereby it instructed its insureds and claimants
desiring to have their vehicles repaired at plaintiffs' shop to
obtain two or three other competitive bids from other auto body
repair shops in Salt Lake County.

.Id. The amount State Farm

would then pay to repair its insureds' or claimants' vehicles
would be the equivalent of the lowest of the several bids
received.
After State Farm implemented this competitive bid system,
plaintiffs refused and continue to refuse to permit other

competing auto body shops to render competitive bids on plaintiffs'
property.

R. 35-44, 100-102, 2328 at pp. 194, 242 at pp. 169. As

a result of plaintiffs' refusal to permit competing auto body
repair shops on their premises to provide competitive bids, and
plaintiffs' repeated refusal to accept State Farm's estimates,
without excessive supplemental estimates, State Farm and its
insureds and claimants have been greatly inconvenienced.
32-44, 96-110.

R.

Plaintiffs' misconduct has required State Farm's

employees to spend substantially more time, which in turn involves
significantly greater expense, in servicing claims handled by
plaintiffs than by other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake
County.

Id.
During the course of State Farm's lengthy business deal-

ings with plaintiffs' shop, State Farm has also documented numerous times in which plaintiffs have deviated from the repair
estimates submitted to them by State Farm insureds and claimants.
R. 32-39, 107-110, 238 at pp. 186-88.

Plaintiffs have at times

failed to supply certain repairs or parts when specifically called
for under State Farm's estimates and for which State Farm has
compensated plaintiffs.

icL

Likewise, plaintiffs have at times

utilized used or repaired parts while charging State Farm and
other insurers for the cost of new parts.

R. 238 at pp. 186-88.

On or about November 19, 1987, plaintiffs brought suit
against defendants asserting violations of the Utah Anti-Trust
Act, defamation and tortious interference with business relations.
Plaintiffs' complaint asserted claims of a "conspiracy" between

State Farm and its employee, Leon Maxwell, claims of illegal
channeling of State Farm insureds and claimants to other automobile body repair shops, claims of using market surveys to establish a prevailing competitive rate, and claims of certain
allegedly defamatory statements made to State Farm insureds and
claimants during the adjusting process.

R. 2-10.

Following extensive discovery, defendants moved for
summary judgment on plaintiffs' complaint.

For purposes of the

motion, defendants assumed the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint to be true.

R. 47-48.

The parties submitted various

affidavits in conjunction with defendants' motion for summary
judgment.

Following extensive oral argument, the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable James S. Sawaya
presiding, on June 1, 1989 issued a Memorandum Decision granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment.

An order of summary

judgment was entered in favor of defendants on June 12, 1989.

R.

225-26.
Plaintiffs now appeal from the June 12, 1989 Order
summarily dismissing their claims with prejudice.

On appeal,

plaintiffs apparently confess no error in the trial court's
granting of summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim under the Utah
Anti-Trust Act.

See Appellants' Brief.

This Court's review of

the trial court's ruling is limited to the dismissal of
plaintiffs' claims of defamation and tortious interference with
business relations.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs alleged in the court below that plaintiffs
"established and carried out a continuous and willful plan of
defamation."

Plaintiffs attribute various allegedly defamatory

statements to defendants, including statements concerning the
quality of plaintiffs' work, the prices that plaintiffs charged
for their work, and plaintiffs' business practices.
Plaintiffs' cause of action for defamation fails for several reasons.

First, the allegedly defamatory statements were

privileged; second, the statements were expressions of nonactionable opinion; third, the statements did not impute any specific criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude; and
lastly, the statements were substantiated in truth and fact.
Plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with business
relations was likewise properly dismissed.

Plaintiffs failed to

produce any evidence that defendants' conduct was for an improper
purpose or by improper means.

In fact, defendants' actions were

for the legitimate and proper purpose of protecting their own
interests, as well as those of State Farm's insureds.

The means

used by defendants in promoting and achieving such legitimate
goals were wholly proper under Utah law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF DEFAMATION.
In the trial court below, plaintiffs generally alleged
that defendants "established and carried out a continuous and
willful plan of defamation."

R. 6.

Specifically, plaintiffs

alleged that defendants defamed them in the following manner:

R. 6-7.

1.

Defendants told customers and potential
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs
did inferior work;

2.

Defendants told customers and potential
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs'
prices were too high;

3.

Defendants told customers, potential customers and others that plaintiffs were
dishonest or "crooks"; and

4.

Defendants told customers and potential
customers of plaintiffs that plaintiffs'
shop should be avoided and that other
shops performed better automobile repairs.

Plaintiffs further alleged that they sustained

irreparable damage to their "reputation in the automobile body and
paint repair industries" and "in the community at large" as a
result of the alleged statements.

R. 7.

In reviewing the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants, it is important to note that for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, defendants assumed the
truthfulness of the allegations contained in plaintiffs'
complaint.

R. 47-48.

As a result, the issue squarely before

this Court is not a determination of whether genuine issues of

material fact exist, but whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the undisputed facts in this case.
Simply put, this Court need only determine whether the trial court
committed error in applying the law to the facts in this case.
A.

The Allegedly Defamatory Statement Attributed
to Defendants Were Privileged.
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs' allegations of

defamation are true, the undisputed facts in this case establish
that all of the statements attributed to defendants were published
to State Farm's insureds and claimants who were seeking to have
State Farm appraise, adjust and pay for the damage to their
automobiles.

Plaintiff Bryan Christensen admits that defendants'

statements were made solely to persons with whom defendants had a
contractual or legal duty to appraise, adjust, and pay for
damages.

R. 238 at pp. 117-188. While defendants' statements

might be actionable in other contexts, Utah law clearly shields
defendants from liability under the facts of this case.
The Utah Supreme Court in Carter v. Jackson, 10 Utah 2d
284, 351 P.2d 957, 958 (1960), recognized the existence of two
classes of privileged communications:
ditional.

absolute and qualified/con-

In Carter, the defendant city councilman allegedly

defamed the plaintiff, a police officer, in a city council
meeting by claiming that plaintiff had propositioned a woman to
whom he issued a traffic citation.

The trial court directed a

verdict in favor of the defendant.

In affirming the lower court's

action, the Utah Supreme Court found that the defendant's statements were absolutely privileged since they were uttered in an

official proceeding of the city council.

In recognizing the exis-

tence of privileged communications, the court stated:
In the case of absolutely privileged communications the utterance or publication, although
both false and malicious, does not give rise to
a cause of action. In the case of a qualified
or conditional privilege the law raises merely
a prima facie presumption in favor of the
occasion.
Id.
Utah Code Ann. §45-2-3(3) (1953) sets forth those
communications that are privileged by statute, including
communications between persons having a "common interest" in a
particular subject matter:
A privileged publication or broadcast which
shall not be considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made:
* * *

(3)

In a communication, without
malice, to a person interested
therein, by one who is also
interested, or by one who stands
in such relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the
motive for the communication
innocent, or who is requested by
the person interested to give the
information.

Under the common interest privilege, malice is not inferred from
the mere fact of the communication or publication.
Ann. §45-2-4 (1953).

Utah Code

See also, Utah Code Ann. §76-9-506 (1953)

The court in Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 67 N.C.App. 271, 312 S.E.2d 905 (1984), addressed
allegations similar to those made by plaintiffs in this action.
In Williams, the plaintiff, the owner of a body shop, brought suit

against defendant State Farm and two State Farm claims agents.
The dispute originally arose out of the repair of an automobile.
Plaintiff had prepared a repair estimate on a State Farm insured
vehicle.

State Farm, however, refused to accept the estimate and

offered plaintiff a lower amount to repair the vehicle.

After

plaintiff refused to repair the automobile for the price State
Farm offered to pay, the vehicle was then repaired by another
shop.

The final cost of repair exceeded plaintiff's original

estimate.

Plaintiff also introduced evidence that defendants'

claims agents had on at least four occasions attempted to discourage persons from having plaintiff repair their vehicles.

The

agents' communications included statements that State Farm had
experienced trouble working with plaintiff in the past and preferred not to work with him in the future, and that plaintiff put
used parts in cars while charging State Farm for new parts.

The

trial court directed a verdict in favor of State Farm.
In affirming the lower court's actions, the North
Carolina court stated:
If statements are slanderous per se, the
question arises of whether they were qualifiedly
privileged.
A qualified or conditionally privileged
communication is one made in good faith
on any subject matter in which the person
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if
made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty on a privileged occasion
and in a manner and under circumstances
fairly warranted by the occasion and duty,
right, or interest. The essential elements

thereof are . . . good faith, an interest
to be upheld, a statement limited in its
scope to this purpose, a proper occasion,
and publication in a proper manner and to
proper parties only.
Stewart v. Check Corp., 279 N.C. 278, 285, 182
S.E.2d 410, 415 (1971) (quoting 50 Am.Jur.2d
Libel and Slander, §195 (1970)). If a qualified
privilege exists, plaintiff has the burden of
proving actual malice to destroy the qualified
privilege.
* * *

The thrust of the above conversations is that
defendants had trouble working with plaintiff
in the past and preferred not to work with him
in the future. There is no question that
plaintiff and defendants had disputes over
repair work. Further, the only specific
instance mentioned by defendant Cox was that
plaintiff put used parts in cars and charged
defendant State Farm for new parts. Plaintiff
admitted that he did this and that if there was
excess money he gave it to the customer. Since
plaintiff admitted the truth of the statements
made by defendants, the remarks were not
actionable as slander. The court thus correctly
granted directed verdict for defendant as to
the slander claim.
* * *

Defendant State Farm had a legitimate business
interest in getting automobiles which it insured
repaired correctly and for the lowest price.
Williams, 312 S.E.2d at 908-09.
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise recognized the "common interest" privilege.

In Hales v. Commercial Bank, 114 Utah

186, 197 P.2d 910 (1948), the plaintiff sued defendant bank for
defamation.

Plaintiff's mother had received a $40 old age assis-

tance check from the State of Utah.

The bank received the check

after it had been altered in several respects, including a forged

endorsement.

After the check was returned unpaid to the bank, the

bank and the State of Utah began an investigation.

Defendant's

employee, Dixon, allegedly made defamatory statements about
plaintiff to plaintiff's brother and a Max Packard.

Packard's

name also appeared as an endorsement on the back of the check.
The employee allegedly told plaintiff's brother and Packard that
plaintiff was suspected of the forgery.

A jury returned a verdict

in favor of defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff sought reversal of the judgment,
claiming that the trial court had committed error by instructing
the jury that the communications were privileged as a matter of
law.

In affirming the trial court's instruction, the Utah Supreme

Court noted:
Packard and the bank were both victims of the
forgery . . . . Packard and the bank were both
legally interested in the communication which
would relate to the identity of the perpetrator
of the fraud. The statute [the predecessor
section to Utah Code Ann. §76-9-506 (1953)]
merely requires that both persons be interested
in the communication which contains the defamatory matter.
* * *

Unquestionably defendants had such an interest
in the subject matter as to bring them clearly
within [the privilege]. The evidence is undisputed that defendant bank had been defrauded by
means of a forged endorsement, in the face amount
of Hales' check. The perpetrator of the act
which defrauded the bank was subject to penalty
under the penal code of this state as well as
liable in an action for damages.
Likewise, Packard's knowledge of the suspicions
of defendant Dixon as to the guilty party would

in all likelihood be of service in the lawful
protection of the bank's interest. Packard's
endorsement had been forged on the check. Not
only might Packard have the signature of the
suspect, but he might have information or means
of obtaining information as to whether the
suspect might have ready access to instruments
bearing Packard's genuine signature from which
a carbon tracing was made on the check. Within
the rule cited, the communication to Packard
was clearly conditionally privileged, and the
court did not err in so instructing the jury.
Hales, 197 P.2d at 913-14.
Likewise, in Knight v. Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 242, 436
P.2d 801 (1968), the court recognized a conditional privilege for
communications made pursuant to a business relationship.

In

Knight, plaintiff and defendant became business partners in a
motel business.

During an audit of the motel's business records,

defendant became suspicious that plaintiff had embezzled certain
funds.

Plaintiff denied defendant's accusations of embezzlement.

Defendant then told two individuals, Campbell and Warner, that
plaintiff had embezzled funds.

Campbell was an employee of a

finance company from whom plaintiff had obtained a loan, and for
which defendant had co-signed.

Warner was plaintiff's attorney.

Defendant made his statement to Warner during a discussion about
the merits of the lawsuit brought by plaintiff.

The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
In affirming the lower court's granting of summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the defendant's
communication to Campbell was privileged since the parties to the
action and Campbell were involved together in a business
transaction.

Knight, 436 P.2d at 802. The court also found that

the defendant's statements to plaintiff's attorney were
privileged.

1(3. at 803,

The determination of whether a communication is privileged may be properly decided by a trial court as a matter of
law.

Combes v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 119 Utah 407, 228 P.2d

272 (1951).

In Combes, plaintiff was allegedly defamed by

defendant, who performed a spot check on plaintiff's compliance
with the rules and procedure of his employer.

Defendant

allegedly told two of plaintiff's co-workers that money was missing from the cash register and inquired as to plaintiff's
honesty.

After the close of trial, the trial court entered a

directed verdict for the defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, and held that the trial
court did not err in determining as a matter of law that the
communications were privileged.

The court stated:

Where the facts regarding the circumstances
of publication are substantially without
dispute as here, the existence of a conditional privilege is a question for the court.
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 619, Hales v.
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, Utah 1948,
197 P.2d 910, 913. If there is any dispute
about the facts, they are to be determined
by the jury. Newell, Slander and Libel,
4th Ed. Sec. 395.
Combes, 228 P.2d at 274-75 (emphasis added).

In this case, the

evidence is undisputed that all of the communications relied upon
by plaintiff fall within the "common interest" privilege.
In order to overcome the conditional privilege accorded
to the alleged statements of defendants, plaintiffs in this case
had to plead and prove excessive or malicious publication of the

defamatory statements.

Knight, 436 P.2d at 802; Combes, 228 P.2d

at 277; Utah Code Ann.

§§45-2-3(3), 45-2-4, 76-9-506 (1953).

The trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs failed to
produce any evidence of excessive or malicious publication.

The

mere fact that a statement may be false and defamatory is insufficient to establish that defendants acted maliciously.

Fong v.

Merena, 655 P.2d 875 (Hawaii 1982); Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson,
105 Wash.2d 653, 717 P.2d 1371 (1986).

The affidavits submitted

by defendants clearly established that the alleged statements
made by defendants were made in good faith.

Plaintiffs fail to

cite this court to any evidence in the record that defendants
acted with ill will or malice in making the allegedly defamatory
statements.

Plaintiffs' failure to establish the requisite

malice required to overcome the conditional privilege enjoyed by
defendants in communicating with their insureds and/or claimants
is sufficient ground for affirming the trial court's action.
In Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court held that summary judgment is proper in a defamation action where a plaintiff fails to oppose the motion by
providing some evidentiary basis for claiming that the statements
were made maliciously.

In Lind, plaintiffs, the president and

corporate attorney of A.N.R. Corporation, brought suit against
defendant Lynch, a stockholder in the same corporation.

Plain-

tiffs brought their action after defendant mailed a proxy solicitation to the stockholders of the corporation claiming that the
plaintiffs were guilty of fraud, deceit and conspiracy.

The

trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding
that the defendant's statements were conditionally privileged
since the parties shared a common business interest.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the
statements fell within a conditional privilege, but remanded the
action back to the trial court for a determination of whether the
publication was made with malice.

In reaching its decision, the

court noted that the defendant would have been entitled to prevail
on his motion had he supported the motion with some evidentiary
evidence that there was no malice:
In Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., supra, the
the court held that because neither pleadings
nor affidavit raised any issue of malice, the
court properly granted a motion for summary
judgment on the libel claim. The court stated:
If [appellant] Mr. Van Woerden had placed
in issue the question of [respondent]
Cudahy's good faith, then Cudahy, as the
moving party, would have been required to
support its motion by some evidentiary
material beyond its pleadings.
Id. 22 Wash.App. at 282, 588 P.2d at 1225.
In the case before us, the allegation in
plaintiff's complaint of malice required the
defendant to have supported his motion by some
evidentiary material that there was no malice.
The record shows that defendant made no effort
in that regard. Therefore, the plaintiff's
allegation of malice stood unchallenged and the
granting of the motion for summary judgment on
that issue was error.
Had defendant presented some evidentiary material refuting any malice on his part, and had
the plaintiffs failed to respond to it, the
trial court could have ruled that there was

no genuine issue of fact on the question of
whether the publication was made without malice.
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to support
their claim of malice with any direct evidence of defendants'
alleged ill-will or reckless disregard.

The affidavits submitted

by defendants, on the other hand, clearly establish that defendants
did not act with the requisite malice so as to vitiate the common
interest privilege.

As a result, defendants' alleged statements

were not actionable as a matter of law, and the trial court
committed no error in dismissing plaintiffs' defamation claim.
B.

The Allegedly Defamatory Statements Attributed to
Defendants Constituted Mere Opinion.
The common law rule that an expression of opinion may be

the basis of an action for defamation was severely criticized in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 339 (1974).

In Gertz, the

plaintiff, an attorney who represented the family of a murder
victim, brought suit against the defendant publisher.

After a

police officer had been convicted of the murder, defendant published an article alleging that the trial was part of a Communist
conspiracy to discredit the local police, and falsely stated that
plaintiff had helped "frame" the police officer who had been
convicted of the murder.

The article also implied that plaintiff

had a criminal record, and labeled him a "Communist-fronter."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

The trial

court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant.
The court of appeals affirmed.

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial.

In reaching its decision,

the court noted:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing
as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscious of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Id. at 339.
The principle that expressions of opinion should generally not form the basis for defamation actions is founded upon
sound public policy.

First, unlike statements of fact, expres-

sions of opinion cannot be established to be true or false.
Second, uninhibited and wide open discussion of opinion on a variety of issues is to be encouraged.

As a result, statements of

opinion should not held to be actionable except under very limited
circumstances, none of which apply in this case.
(Second) of Torts §566 (1977).
750 F.2d 970 (D.C.

See Restatement

See also, Oilman v. Evans,

Cir. 1984); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304

(10th Cir. 1983); Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 402 Mass.
376, 522 N.E.2d 959 (1988); Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 760
P.2d 57 (Mont. 1988); and Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d 60,
520 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1987).

Furthermore, the determination of

whether a statement constitutes opinion or fact may be made by a
trial court as a matter of law.

Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill.App.3d

523, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (1988); and Gernander v. Winona State Univ.,
428 N.W.2d 473 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988).
In the instant action, the allegedly defamatory

statements are properly categorized as opinion.

Statements that

the plaintiffs' prices are too high, that the plaintiffs' work is
of questionable quality, and that the plaintiffs may have
unspecified questionable business practices constitutes opinion.
The trial court correctly held that such statements were not
actionable as a matter of law.
C.

The Statements Attributed to Defendants Regarding
Plaintiffs' Dishonesty Are Not Actionable.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants have defamed them by

stating to State Farm insureds and claimants that plaintiffs are
dishonest or "crooks."

The record is devoid of any allegation

that defendants have ever related any specific act of dishonesty
or criminal offense to plaintiffs.

The record likewise lacks any

specific allegation of special damages sustained by plaintiffs as
a result of such statements.

While one may be defamed by

slanderous imputations of criminal conduct, the statements relied
upon by plaintiff failed to establish a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Under well established principles, general allegations
of dishonesty or ciminality are not actionable.
(Second) of Torts §§570, 571 (1977).

See Restatement

In Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs,

678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court noted that
statements of criminal conduct or dishonesty must be specific in
order to be actionable.

In Auto West, plaintiff automobile

dealers and shareholders commenced action against defendant
seeking an accounting and return of all moneys allegedly taken
from plaintiff's auto dealership.

Defendant counterclaimed for

defamation.

Defendant claimed that plaintiff had told several

individuals that defendant had "stolen" or "embezzled" company
funds.

The trial court awarded defendant $25,000 in damages for

defamation, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
The alleged defamatory statements in this case consist
solely of claims that defendants stated that plaintiffs were
"dishonest" or "crooks." Unlike in Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678
P.2d 286 (Utah 1984), there is no allegation or evidence that the
defendants in this action charged plaintiffs with any specific
criminal conduct.

While a statement charging another with spe-

cific criminal conduct is defamation per se, the alleged statements by defendants in this action fall far short of imputing
criminal conduct to the plaintiffs.
The Utah Supreme Court in Prince v. Petersen, 5 38 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1975), recognized that general statements about one
being a "crook" may not be actionable.

In Prince, defendant

allegedly told several individuals who were looking to purchase
plaintiff's family business that plaintiff was a "clever crook"
and was "stealing from his own children."
against defendants for defamation.
for plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought suit

The jury returned a verdict

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the

award for defamation.

The court refused, however, to find that

the word "crook" was defamatory per se.

Id_. at 1327-28.

Several courts have summarily disposed of defamation
claims based upon allegedly slanderous statements involving the
word "crook."

In Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo. 37, 388 P.2d 779

(1963), the Colorado Supreme Court found no error in a trial
court's holding that the word "crook" did not constitute slander
per se.

In Cinquanta, the plaintiff brought a defamation action

against the defendant after the defendant allegedly defamed him
stating:

"I don't like doing business with crooks.

deadbeat.
crooks."

You're a

You've owed me $155 for three or four months.

You're

The statements were made in the plaintiff's restaurant

during the course of an argument.

The trial court dismissed the

action and plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim of defamation, by stating:
[W]e must determine whether the words spoken
by the defendant were such as to either impute
a crime to the plaintiff or to affect his credit
and financial reputation by imputing financial
difficulty or dishonesty for in such cases the
law in Colorado permits recovery for slander
without proof of special damages.
We must first consider whether the words "crook"
or "crooks" impute a crime or a criminal offense
to the plaintiff. In determining this question
we cannot isolate the offending words from their
context and we must examine the words in light
of the total attendant circumstances.
To come within the exception permitting recovery
in an action for slander without proof of special
damage because the words spoken impute a crime,
it is the general rule that such words must
impute conduct constituting a criminal offense
chargeable by indictment or by information
either at common law or by statute and of such
kind as to involve infamous punishment or moral
turpitude conveying the idea of major social
disgrace. Mere words of abuse spoken in outbursts of excitement or passion do not constitute slander per se. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does

not in itself make the words used slander
per se. It is true that the word "crook" is
derogatory, but the word does not in and of
itself impute the commission of a crime. In
view of the popular use of the word "crook"
in common language to denote conduct with which
the speaker is displeased and with so many
dictionary definitions of the word which refer
to matters not chargeable as a crime, it is
clear to us that the naked use of the word
"crook" does not constitute slander per se.
Cinquanta, 388 P.2d at 780 (emphasis added).
In Cummings v. Kirby, 216 Neb. 314, 343 N.W.2d 747
(1984), the plaintiff brought suit against his mother's attorney
based on the attorney's statement to the plaintiff's mother that
everyone in the county knew that her son was a "crook."

The

trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Nebraska Supreme
Court stated:
Cummings' cause of action is legally deficient
on another ground. The petition in this matter
alleged that Kirby stated that others referred
to Cummings as a "crook." The court has stated
that the "crook" is a word of general abuse,
and while derogatory and disparaging, does not
constitute a basis for recovery of damages in
the absence of a specific allegation of special
damages.
Cummings, 343 N.W.2d at 749.
Likewise, the court in Ceravola v. Brown, 364 So.2d 1155
(Ala. 1978), sustained the entry of summary judgment for a
defendant on a claim that the defendant had slandered the
plaintiff in public by calling him a "deadbeat" and a "crook."
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged as follows:
The defendant, Norman K. Brown, has on
numerous occasions, and before people,

threatened the plaintiff with arrest and
criminal prosecution, and did have others
call and threaten the same. Defendant has
called plaintiff a deadbeat and a crook,
and has threatened before a large group of
people to drive the plaintiff crazy.
Defendant has by his numerous malicious
actions against this plaintiff, including
his use of abusive, insulting and offensive
language and use of ethnic slurs against
the plaintiff, attempted to slander and
libel the plaintiff and to ruin his reputation and indeed drive him crazy.
Plaintiff will show unto this honorable
court that as a direct result of the
defendant's actions, his reputation has
been irreparably damaged, he has been
ruined in the business community, and his
credit standing has been diminished.
On appeal, the Alabama court noted that the plaintiff
had failed to allege any special damages.

In addition, the court

noted that to constitute slander per se, the statement must
impute an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude.
As a result, the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant, by stating:
While it may be odious to berate someone in
public with threats and ethnic slurs and to
attack someone with epitaphs such as "deadbeat"
and "crook," such questionable behavior is,
nevertheless, not actionable in Alabama absent
allegations of special damages. Even under our
liberalized rules of procedure, Rule 9(g) A.R.C.P.
still requires special damages to be specifically
stated, and without them, Ceravolo's complaint
does not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Id. at 1157.

See also, Klein v. McGauley, A.D.2d 418, 288

N.Y.S.2d 751, 755 (1968) ("Standing alone, the word "crook" is
no doubt defamatory and actionable per se when written, but it
cannot be said to charge an indictable crime involving moral

turpitude or infamous punishment, an element necessary to a
finding of slander per se, without further refinement or reference to a specific act . . . .

[T]he word "crook" is not com-

monly understood today as imputing an indictable crime. Rather,
it is a term used frequently as a simple expression of opprobrium
and applied to persons not guilty of any crime.

However abusive,

it has been bandied about to such an extent that its sting has
been greatly reduced.")
The trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of defendants on plaintiffs' claim of defamation based on statements that plaintiffs are "crooks" is further supported by the
affidavits submitted by defendants in support of defendants'
motion.

The undisputed evidence is that plaintiffs have at times

engaged in questionable business practices.

The record

establishes that plaintiffs frequently deviate from estimates by
failing to use new parts or make directed repairs, without
notifying State Farm or reimbursing State Farm for parts not used
or repairs not made.

State Farm's knowledge of such questionable

practices has come about solely as a result of State Farm's policy to reinspect vehicles repaired by plaintiffs and other automobile body shops.

The fact that State Farm has paid plaintiffs

for requested services which were never rendered clearly
establishes that the claim that plaintiffs are "dishonest" or
"crooks" is substantially true.

As such, truth is an absolute

defense to plaintiffs' defamation action.
290.

Auto West, 678 P.2d at

Defendants' alleged statements that plaintiffs are
"dishonest" or "crooks" do not constitute slander per se. No
specific acts of dishonesty or criminal offense were ever
attributed to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs further failed to produce

any evidence of any specific special damages sustained by them as
a result of defendants' statements.

As a result, plaintiffs'

cause of action for defamation fails as a matter of law.
D.

Defendants' Allegedly Defamatory Statements Were True.
Under well established Utah law, truth is an absolute

defense in a defamation action.

Auto West, 678 P.2d at 290. The

trial court correctly ruled that the alleged statements made by
defendants were not actionable since defendants demonstrated that
the alleged statements were substantially true.

At the trial

level, defendants submitted unrefutted evidence establishing the
following facts and good faith opinions:
1.

Plaintiffs' repair work often deviates from the
repair estimates written by defendants and accepted
by plaintiffs themselves, including plaintiffs' use
of used or repaired parts in place of new parts as
called for in the repair estimates issued by
defendants. R. 35-44, 96-99, 107-110.

2.

Plaintiffs' own employees have admitted that they
seek to obtain additional sums from defendant State
Farm beyond that actually expended or required on
a particular repair estimate. R. 35-39, 96-99.

3.

Plaintiffs' unusual and unreasonable charges for
towing, storage, and deposit fees. R. 32-39,
103-06.

4.

Plaintiffs' labor rates for body work are higher than
the prevailing competitive rate in Salt Lake County.
R. 35-44, 96-99, 103-06.

5.

Plaintiffs' own statements that they attempt to hide
disputed charges in billings to insurance companies.

R. 103-06.
6.

Plaintiffs' repair work is comparable or inferior
to repair work performed by other automobile
repair shops in Salt Lake County. R. 35-39,
103-110.

The evidence before the trial court established that the statements allegedly made by defendants regarding plaintiffs'
dishonesty were substantiated in truth and fact.

As such, the

trial court correctly ruled that the alleged statements were not
actionable as a matter of law.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
Plaintiffs on appeal assert that the trial court erred
in dismissing their claim that defendants tortiously interfered
with plaintiffs' prospective business relations.

The tort of

tortious interference with economic relations was recognized in
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
In Leigh Furniture, plaintiff sold a furniture business in St.
George, Utah to defendant on contract in 1970.

In 1975,

plaintiff brought action against defendant to repossess the
business, terminate his interest under the contract, and obtain a
deficiency judgment.

Defendant denied being in default under the

agreement, and counterclaimed for damages caused when plaintiff
allegedly forced defendant out of business and into bankruptcy.
The jury found for defendant in all respects, and awarded damages
on defendants' counterclaim.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic relations,
finding that the plaintiff's verbal abuse of the defendant and
plaintiff's over zealous attempts to protect his contract
interests crossed the threshold of tortious conduct.

Before

recognizing such a cause of action, the court reviewed various
tests or standards for the prima facie tort of interference with
prospective economic relations.

In rejecting the approach

offered by the authors of the Restatement of Torts, the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the definition of the tort of interference
with prospective economic relations given by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283
Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365 (1978):
We recognize a common-law cause of action for
intentional interference with prospective
business relations, and adopt the Oregon
definition of this tort. Under this definition, in order to recover damages, the plaintiff
must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally
interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury
to the plaintiff. Privilege is an affirmative
defense, Searle v. Johnson, Utah, 646 P.2d 682
(1982), which does not become an issue unless
"the acts charged would be tortious on the part
of an unprivileged defendant." Top Service Body
Shop, Inc., 283 Or. at 210, 582 P.2d at 1371.
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304.
In Top Service Body Shop, the Oregon court was faced
with a situation similar to that presented here.

The plaintiff

automobile body repair shop sued defendant insurance company for
damages allegedly resulting from defendant's practice of

_OQ_

directing insurance claimants to have repairs made at other body
shops.

Plaintiff1s complaint included a claim of tortious inter-

ference with plaintiff's business.

Defendant Allstate denied the

allegations and raised an affirmative defense asserting that its
actions were privileged.

A jury verdict in excess of $300,000

was returned in favor of plaintiff.

On Allstatefs motion, the

trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial court had
erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
claim of tortious interference.

Plaintiff had alleged both

improper motives and improper means of interference on the part
of Allstate.

Plaintiff alleged that Allstate induced plaintiff's

patrons not to have plaintiff repair their automobiles by making
false statements about the quality of plaintiff's work, and
threatening to withdraw insurance coverage.

However, there was

no direct evidence of any specific purpose on the part of
Allstate to destroy plaintiff's business.

The Oregon Supreme

Court noted that while such an intent could have been inferred
from Allstate's conduct in directing customers to other body
repair shops, "the record will not support an inference that
Allstate had any design or purpose to inflict injury on Top
Service as such, even short of the 'sole design' to put Top
Service out of business that the complaint alleges."

Id. at

1372.
The Oregon court, in reviewing the evidence at trial,
stated:

[T]he evidence showed that Allstate has a
practice of designating certain repair shops
in the locality as "competitor shops" to
which it prefers to send insurance claimants
for whose repairs Allstate is obligated; that
Top Service at one time was a "drive-in" shop
for Allstate, where claimants would be directed
for an estimate by an Allstate insurance
adjuster; that after a dispute Top Service's
owner decided that it would not continue as a
drive-in shop for Allstate; and that thereafter
Allstate adjusters would actually discourage
claimants under its insurance policies from
taking work to be paid for by Allstate to Top
Service, sending them instead to other shops
on its preferred list. As specific bases for
an inference of destructive purpose, Top
Service listed two occasions when Allstate
adjusters disparaged the quality of Top
Service's work (apart from its relative cost),
although Allstate's personnel had generally
considered Top Service a high quality shop;
Allstate's willingness to disappoint its own
insured who preferred Top Service; one occasion
when Allstate took its option to "total" a car,
i.e. to pay off its value, when the insured
wanted it repaired at Top Service; and finally
All state's resort to "improper and unlawful
means" to direct business away from Top Service
to other shops.
Id. at 1372.
In affirming the trial court's entry of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the tortious interference claim,
the Oregon court stated:
[W]e agree with the trial court that these
acts were wholly consistent with Allstate's
pursuit of its own business purposes as it
saw them and did not suffice to support an
inference of the alleged improper purpose
to injure Top Service. The court's ruling
on this point was not error.
Id. (emphasis added).
Since the Utah Supreme Court's pronouncement in Leigh
Furniture, the Utah Court of Appeals in Sampson v. Richins, 770

P.2d 998 (Ut.Ct.App. 1989), explored the requirements for claimi
intentional interference with economic relations, by stating:
In order to establish "improper purpose"
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's interference is maliciously motivated,
"'in the sense of spite and a desire to do harm
to the plaintiff for its own sake . . . . ' "
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307 (quoting W.
Prosser, Handbook of Law of Torts §129 at 943
(4th ed. 1971)). In a case of mixed motives,
a court must determine the defendant's predominant purpose underlying his conduct. Id.
"Problems inherent in proving motivation or
purpose make it prudent for commercial conduct
to be regulated for the most part by the
improper means alternative, which typically
requires only a showing of particular conduct."
Id.
The improper means element "is satisfied where
the means used to interfere with a party's
economic relations are contrary to law, such
as violations of statutes, regulations, or
recognized common-law rules. Such acts are
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence
are clearly 'improper' means of interference."
Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308 (citations
omitted).
IdL at 1003.
Plaintiffs in this case seek reversal of the entry of
summary judgment on their claim for tortious interference with
prospective business relations by claiming that they produced
evidence that defendants improperly interfered with their
customers.

Plaintiffs also claim support in the record for thei

allegation that defendants have engaged in such conduct for an
improper purpose through various improper means, including
"threats, intimidation, misrepresentation, defamation and
disparaging falsehoods."

(Plaintiffs' Brief at 14)

Despite plaintiffs' assertion that defendants' actions

are geared to drive them out of business, the record is devoid of
any evidence to support such a proposition.

Though the relation-

ship between plaintiffs and defendants has often been acrimonious
and hostile, the undisputed evidence is that State Farm continues
to permit its insureds and claimants to have their automobiles
repaired by plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Bryan Christensen testified

that his company performed nearly 100 repairs for State Farm
insureds in 1987, the last year for which he had any figures.
R. 238 at pp. 199-205.

While plaintiffs' work for State Farm

has decreased over the last several years, the apparent void left
by State Farm was filled by repair work for other insurers,
including Allstate Insurance.

_id.

In addition, plaintiffs'

gross receipts have increased from approximately $536,000 in 1980
to more than $820,000 in 1987.

id.

If defendants' actions were

intended to drive plaintiffs out of business, such efforts failed
to have the "desired" effect.
State Farm introduced unrefuted evidence to the trial
court that the decline in plaintiffs' work for State Farm
corresponded to a significant down-turn in the total number of
claims handled by State Farm in Utah.

In 1985, State Farm

reported 69,685 claims, in 1986 66,247 claims, and in 1987 65,847
claims.

R. 213-15.

The "downturn" in business complained of by

plaintiffs has been greatly impacted by the fact that State Farm
has had fewer claims in the past few years.

With fewer available

opportunities to work on State Farm claims, the decline in plaintiffs' work for State Farm is more the result of mild winters than
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State Farm's desire to drive plaintiffs out of business. IcL
In the event that State Farm truly wanted to put
plaintiffs out of business, State Farm could surely avail itself
of its legal right to entirely direct State Farm insureds away
from plaintiffs' business.

The United States Supreme Court has

consistently held that an individual or entity may unilaterally
refuse to deal with whomever it pleases.
Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

United States v.

See also, McKenzie v.

Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); Buy-Rite Dist.,
Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 577 F.Supp. 530 (D. Utah 1983).
Furthermore, courts have generally recognized the right of a
party to refuse to deal with whomever it chooses based upon a
desire to avoid hostility and potential litigation.

Zoslow v.

RCA Dist. Corp., 693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982).
The propriety of State Farm's motives and actions is
supported by a substantial number of cases which have consistently
found no federal or state anti-trust violations in insurance companies making market surveys, determining "prevailing labor
rates" and directing their insureds/claimants to shops which will
readily accept the insurer's repair estimates.

In Chick's Auto

Body v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 168 N.J.Super. 68, 401
A. 2d 722 (1979), the plaintiff auto body shops brought suit
against various automobile insurance companies on claims of state
anti-trust violations.

After extensive discovery, the New Jersey

court granted the insurance company's motions for summary
judgment, holding that the insurer's activities did not violate

state anti-trust laws.

Chick's Auto Body, 401 A.2d at 729-31.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had
engaged in improper conduct by stating:
The first count of the complaint charges
defendants with "fixing prices." The "prices"
referred to by plaintiffs are the amounts paid
by the carriers to their insured and the alleged
"price-fixing" referred to is the carrier's
refusal to pay more than the prevailing service
rates.
In effect, plaintiffs' price-fixing allegation
seeks to force defendants to pay them a price
higher than the present prevailing service rate
($14.00) accepted by other body shops in the
competitive area. Under the guise of a "pricefixing" claim, plaintiffs seek not to further
price competition, but to avoid it. In effect,
plaintiffs assert that they should not have to
compete with other shops on price. They contend,
instead, that defendants should be required to
pay their insureds whatever price plaintiffs
decide to charge them.
* * *

What plaintiffs describe as price-fixing is, in
fact, no more than a natural consumer-oriented
competitive activity in getting the lowest competitive price.

The Chick's Auto Body court also rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the defendants had engaged in an illegal boycott:
The second count alleges a "boycott" on the
part of defendants. Plaintiffs make frequent
use of the term "leveraged shops." As explained
by one plaintiff, "leveraged shops" are those
included on each carriers list of those body
shops that can be expected to perform repairs
within the particular carrier's estimate. There
is no contention that anyone willing to work at
competitive rates has been excluded from any
list.

Plaintiffs do work for insureds of all defendants; plaintiffs are free to do the work for
the defendants' insureds at the estimates written
by defendants or to turn the business away;
plaintiffs are free to charge and collect from
the defendants' insureds any part of the repair
price which exceeds the insurance reimbursement,
and plaintiffs' allegation that they are "denied"
repair work is only that they have in certain
instances declined jobs because defendant insurance companies' estimate was below plaintiffs'
and the insured did not wish to pay the difference out of his own pocket.
* * *

In trying to obtain the lowest available prices
defendants are doing no more than conducting
their business as any rational enterprise would*
An unlawful boycott would not result from a
buyer's refusal to pay a higher price for goods
or services where it can buy them at a lower
price.
* * *

In addition, plaintiffs must, of course,
establish that any alleged "boycott" and
restraint of trade is the product of some
contract, combination or conspiracy--!.e., a
concerted refusal to deal. Plaintiffs do not
point to any facts which indicate or suggest
that defendants had some agreement with respect to their dealing with plaintiffs, or that
they had conspired or acted in concert on this
subject.
Id. at 730-31 (citations omitted).
Likewise, similar claims were rejected in De Bonaventura
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 419 A.2d 942 (Del.Ch. 1980), aff'd,
428 A.2d 1151 (Del. 1981).

Plaintiffs, six automobile body

repair shops, sought a permanent injunction to require Nationwide
Insurance to increase its damage appraisals.

Plaintiffs alleged

that Nationwide had improperly influenced its insureds to use
certain "preferred" repair shops and to refrain from using

plaintiffs' shops.

Plaintiffs also asserted that the insurer had

engaged in acts of conspiracy in violation of state anti-trust
law, had defamed plaintiffs, and had tortiously interfered with
the plaintiffs' business relationships.

Nationwide denied the

allegations and affirmatively asserted that it acted properly in
serving its own economic self-interests, as well as those of its
insureds.
The trial court noted that the basic issue to be answered
was whether Nationwide "may channel or direct automobile owners
with whom it deals to its preferred shops."
A.2d at 946.

De Bonaventura, 419

The trial court sustained the insurer's right to

channel its insureds away from plaintiffs' shops, and refused to
grant the requested injunctive relief, by stating:
I conclude after trial that the crux of
plaintiffs' grievance is to be found not in
any contrived theory of improper economic
coercion allegedly exercised against plaintiffs
by defendant but in the economic reality that
most car owners with valid claims against the
present defendant have decided that the quality
of the workmanship and materials available at
plaintiffs' shops is not sufficiently superior
to that furnished at the competitive or preferred
shops recommended by defendant to its insureds
and claimants to warrant the paying of money
out of one's own pocket to make up the difference
between plaintiff's prices and those offered by
those shops which quote more competitive prices
* * *

The answer to the question of whether or not to
grant or refuse injunctive relief is often found
in the practical aspects of a situation such as
that presented in the litigation at hand. In
the case at bar, the contracting parties, insofar

as rights arising out of the issuance of insurance
policies here in issue are concerned, are the
insureds on the one hand and Nationwide on the
other. If an insured or claimant in the course
of the settlement of any damage claim covered by
insurance issued by Nationwide is satisfied with
the latter's estimate of the amount of the
reasonable cost to repair a damaged vehicle and
thereafter accepts Nationwidefs choice of a
repair shop to perform such needed repairs, there
would appear to be no basis for granting plaintiffs
the type of permanent injunctive relief which they
pray for here, plaintiffs' grievance being
attributable to the simple fact that their
prices are too high and non-competitive to
enable them to bid successfully for the work
involved in repairing damaged motor vehicles
insured by Nationwide.
Id. at 950-51.

The Delaware Supreme Court found no error in the

opinion of the trial court, and affirmed.

De Bonaventura, 428

A.2d at 1154.
In Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d
1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982), the
plaintiff auto body shop brought suit against defendants,
Allstate and State Farm, for violation of federal anti-trust
laws.

Plaintiff claimed that the defendants' claims-handling

procedures illegally fixed the price of automobile repairs and
resulted in a boycott of plaintiff's business.
successfully moved for summary judgment.

Defendants

On appeal, the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no anti-trust
violation.

Id. at 1200-01.

The Quality Auto Body court also sustained the legality
of the vertical arrangements between the defendant insurance companies and certain "preferred" auto repair shops.
1203-04.

Id. at

The Quality Auto Body court also disposed of the

plaintiff's boycott claim by stating:
The gravamen of Quality's complaint does not
appear to be defendant's refusal to deal but
rather defendant's refusal to pay more than the
prevailing competitive price for labor and new
parts. Although some repair shops which charge
more than the so-called prevailing competitive
rate may suffer some economic losses, these losses
appear basically to be the result of the shops'
inability or unwillingness to meet competition.
The Darwinian workings of competition (which the
anti-trust laws are presumably designed to foster)
mean that high-cost, high-price shops tend to
lose business and might even go out of business
if they cannot become more competitive . . . .
Whatever sympathy one may feel for the body
shops in these circumstances, the anti-trust
laws were not intended to provide redress for
losses resulting from non-competitive prices.
In any event, even if there were evidence that
either or both defendants refused to deal with
Quality, this conduct would not constitute an
illegal boycott without proof of concerted action.
Id. at 1206.

See also Workman v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Ins. Co., 520 F.Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Proctor v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., [1980-81] Trade Cases
(CCH) §63,591 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 308 (1982).
The Utah Insurance Department Regulations likewise
specifically empower insurers to designate specific repair shops
for automobile repairs so long as the repairs restore the vehicle
to its pre-accident condition "at no additional cost to the
claimant other than stated in the policy and within a reasonable
period of time."

Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation,

Utah Insurance Department Regulation R540-89-11(H).
In this case, plaintiffs at the trial court level failed
to produce any evidence that defendants acted with an improper

purpose.

Indeed, the only evidence before the trial court was

that State Farm's actions were for the proper purpose of promoting and protecting its own financial interests, as well as those
of its insureds.

As a result, plaintiffs may not prevail on

appeal unless they can demonstrate evidence that defendants acted
through improper means.

At the trial level, plaintiffs rested

their "improper means" allegation on defendants' alleged violations of the Utah Anti-Trust Act and defamation.
abandoned their anti-trust claim on appeal.

Plaintiffs have

As discussed supra,

plaintiffs' claim of defamation also fails as a matter of law.
Absent any evidence of improper purpose or improper means, the
trial court cannot be said to have acted incorrectly in
dismissing plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships.

This Court should, therefore,

affirm the decision of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully
request that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court.
DATED this

/Z~

day of

^

, 1990.

STRONG 6c HANNI

ranm
Stephen J. Trayner
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

j2- - day of

JtJy'*

1990, four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT were mailed postage prepaid, to:
Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE 6c ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ADDENDUM
Pertinent Statutes, Regulations and Rules

Al - A2

Affidavit of G. Lavan Walker

A3 - A5

Affidavit of Marshall Welch

A6 - A10

Affidavit of Leon Maxwell

All - A15

Affidavit of Ted H. Fish

A16 - A19

Affidavit of Jeffrey Finley

A20 - A22

Affidavit of Chris P. Shipley

A23 - A26

Affidavit of Robert J. Borden

A27 - A30

Amended Affidavit of Leon Maxwell

A31 - A33

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§45-2-3.

Privileged publication of broadcast defined.

A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not
be considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made:

(3) In a communication, without malice, to a
person interested therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the
person interested as to afford a reasonable ground
for supposing the motive for the communication
innocent, or who is requested by the person interested
to give the information.
§45-2-4.

Malice not inferred from publication.

In the cases provided for in Subsections (3), (4) and
(5) of the preceding section, malice is not inferred from
the communication or publication.
§76-9-506.

Privilege as to communications between
interested persons•

A communication made to a person interested in the communication by one who is also interested, or who stands in a
relation to the former as to afford a reasonable ground for
supposing his motive innocent, is not presumed to be
malicious, and is a privileged communication.
UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REGULATION
R540-89-11.

Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable
Settlements Applicable to Automobile Insurance.
* * *

H. When the insurer elects to repair and designates
a specific repair shop for automobile repairs, the insurer
shall cause the damaged automobile to be restored to its
condition prior to the loss at no additional cost to the
claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a
reasonable period of time.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56.

Summary Judgment.

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.

GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,

i
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
G. LAVAN WALKER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,

]
)

Civil NO. C87-7726

Defendants.

Honorable James S. Sawaya

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, G. LAVAN WALKER, having been duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has worked as an estimator for defendant

State Farm for approximately 22 years.
2.

During the course of his employment, affiant has

rendered thousands of property damage estimates for State Farm
insureds and claimants.
3.

S21

Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a day-to-day

A3.

basis since the day plaintiffs' business was established.
4.

Affiant has found plaintiffs to be among the most

difficult individuals and repair shops to deal with over the
course of his 22-year career with State Farm.
5.

Affiant has handled hundreds of claims estimates

which have been serviced by plaintiffs.
6.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

verbally abuse and deride affiant's employer, State Farm, and
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell.
7.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that State Farm is
trying to "cut plaintiffs* business down," and that State Farm is
"not qualified to tell plaintiffs how to run their business."
8.

On numerous occasions, affiant has reinspected

automobiles repaired by plaintiffs and observed that the repairs
performed by plaintiffs deviated from the repair estimates submitted to and accepted by plaintiffs.
9.

Based upon affiant's experience in the automobile

body repair field, affiant * ^

o£

—l

hm

M^irrtrrn t-h*f of K^r—?m4^MTm-

birJre-body repair ^liupj in ^jll Lake CuuiiLy ao superior mrrkr than
plaintiffs', and that plaintiffs have on occasion submitted excessive and unreasonable towing and storage fees.

S21
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DATED this

/y

day of

^/^T?J^

, 1988.

(X. LAVAN WALKER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /^?7Aday of

l\)otf&nnhP.r

. 1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC

O

Residing a t t S a j - l - L a b t ^ £oU.n-ly*
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

t(fa

day of /]0<e<rt^

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
G. LaVan Walker was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

S21-AFFID511/8/88nh
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARSHALL K. WELCH

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. C87-7726
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,

Honorable James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, MARSHALL K. WELCH, having been duly sworn,
hereby deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has been an employee of defendant State

Farm since December, 1985.
2.

Affiant is currently employed as a claims supervisor

and is responsible for supervising various claims estimators.
Prior to serving as claims supervisor, affiant was employed as a
property damage estimator for State Farm.

S21
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3.

Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on at least 35-50

occasions since becoming employed by State Farm,
4.

Affiant has handled hundreds of claims with other

automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
5.

Based upon affiant's experience, it is affiant's

opinion that plaintiffs and plaintiffs' employees are inordinately
difficult to work with.
6.

During affiant's dealings with plaintiffs, affiant

has been subjected to plaintiffs' verbal abuse and derision of
affiant's employer, State Farm, and affiant's supervisor, Leon
Maxwell.
7.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that Mr. Maxwell
"has it in" for plaintiffs' shop, that Mr. Maxwell "is dictating
plaintiffs' prices" and that Mr. Maxwell is "trying to control"
the automobile body repair industry in Salt Lake County.
8.

On numerous occasions, affiant has heard plaintiffs

subject other State Farm employees to verbal abuse and derision.
9.

Affiant has heard plaintiffs say, in effect, that

if State Farm refuses to pay additional amounts for certain
supplemental repairs, that plaintiffs "would get it elsewhere" on
another repair item or repair job for State Farm.
10.

Affiant has observed that plaintiffs' towing,

storing and deposit fees are often unusual and unreasonable based

S21
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upon affiant's experience with the automobile body repair
industry in Salt Lake County.
11.

Affiant has observed that plaintiffs' continually

find affiant's and other State Farm estimators' repair estimates
to be "unacceptable" and have required an unusually high number
and percentage of supplemental repair estimates.
12.

As a result of plaintiffs' refusal to find State

Farm's estimates to be acceptable, affiant and State Farm have
been required to use a system of "competitive bids" when dealing
with plaintiffs' shop.
13.

Under the present system of "competitive bids,"

State Farm has its insureds and claimants obtain two or three
bids from plaintiffs' competitors in order to set the reasonable
cost of repair.
14.

Under such a policy of "competitive bids," it is

frequently necessary for State Farm's insureds and claimants to
have plaintiffs' competitors enter onto plaintiffs' premises to
obtain their estimates.
15.

That plaintiffs for several months have refused to

permit their competitors onto plaintiffs' premises to obtain
"competitive bids."
16.

Due to plaintiffs' refusal to permit their

competitors onto their premises, State Farm, its insureds and
claimants have been required to have vehicles towed from

S21
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plaintiffs' premises to other locations in order to obtain
competitive bids, all of which results in significant additional
time being spent and expense incurred.
17.

Plaintiffs have required a nonrefundable "deposit

fee" for certain vehicles towed from its premises to another shop
for the purpose of obtaining competitive bids.

This has resulted

in significant inconvenience and expense to affiant, State Farm,
and State Farm's insureds and claimants.
18.

Since early 1988, affiant has served as a

reinspector for State Farm.
19.

As a reinspector, affiant is required to randomly

check automobiles following their repair by automobile body
repair shops, including plaintiffs' shop, in Salt Lake County,
20.

Affiant has reinspected in excess of 300

automobiles.
21.

Affiant has reinspected at least 10 vehicles

repaired at plaintiffs' shop.
22.

On several occasions, affiant has noticed signifi-

cant deviations between the repairs called for in the repair
estimates and the actual repairs performed by plaintiffs.
23.

That based upon affiant's experience with other

automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, it is affiant's
opinion that there are other shops that do better work than
plaintiffs' shop and that plaintiffs' prices for repairs are
S21

A9

generally higher than the prevailing competitive price charged
by other repair shops in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
DATED this

/ T

day of

X ^ d ^ g V ^ ^ ^ , 1988.

MARSHALLv^>-r/
K " WELCHf£
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /S^/i^ay

hir>^ ember

of

1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC
O
Residing at:;S?/-A Lc^hsi

~
Cou^-hs

My Commission Expires

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

~W^_ day

of/k^^L,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
Marshall K. Welch was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall w. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
LEON MAXWELL

I

Civil No. C87-7726

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,

,)

Honorable James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, LEON MAXWELL, having been duly sworn, hereby
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has worked for defendant State Farm for

approximately 16 years.
2.

Affiant has served as property claims superintendent

in the State of Utah for State Farm for approximately the last
five years.
3.

S21

Affiant has had almost day-to-day contact with

All

plaintiffs and plaintiffs' employees since 1981.
4.

Affiant is directly responsible for providing

proper and timely service to State Farm's insureds and claimants.
5.

Affiant is responsible for the supervision and

training of State Farm's estimators and reinspectors and other
individuals, as designated by his supervisors.
6.

As part of affiant's duties to State Farm, affiant

regularly conducts price surveys of automobile repair shops to
establish the prevailing competitive rate for parts, labor,
towing, paint and materials7.

Affiant and State Farm do not share or otherwise

disclose the results of such price surveys to anyone outside of
State Farm.
8.

Affiant conducts such price surveys in order to

protect and promote State Farm's economic interests, as well as
the economic interests of State Farm's insureds.
9.

Affiant conducts such price surveys in order to

secure the highest quality and most economical services available
for State Farm insureds and claimants.
10.

The amounts expended by State Farm to repair its

insureds' and claimants' vehicles is a critical factor in the
setting of automobile liability insurance rates in the State of
Utah.
11.

S21

Based upon such price surveys and affiant's experi-

A12

ence

with plaintiffs, affiant is aware that plaintiffs often

charge more for their services than their competitors, and often
charge more than the prevailing competitive rate.
12.

Affiant has experienced more difficulties in

dealing with plaintiffs that with most other automobile body
shops in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
13.

During the past several years, affiant has been

subjected repeatedly to verbal abuse, profanity, and derision by
plaintiffs and plaintiffs1 employees.
14.

Due to difficulties in dealing with plaintiffs,

affiant and State Farm implemented a program designed to reach
a mutually agreeable repair estimate with plaintiffs whereby
State Farm instructs its insureds and claimants to obtain two or
three competitive bids from plaintiffs1 competitors.
15.

Plaintiffs have refused and continued to refuse

access to their facilities to plaintiffs1 competitors in order to
obtain such competitive bids.
16.

Affiant and other State Farm employees, including

the estimators and reinspectors under affiant's control and
supervision, have been greatly inconvenienced by plaintiffs1
repeated refusals to accept State Farm's estimates, without
excessive supplemental estimates, and plaintiffs' refusal to permit competitors on their premises to provide competitive bids.
17.

S21

As a result of plaintiffs' conduct, State Farm's

A13

employees have been required to spend substantially more time and
expense in servicing claims handled by plaintiffs than by other
automobile body shops in Salt Lake County.
18-

Affiant has on several occasions reinspected auto-

mobiles repaired by plaintiffs and observed that the repairs performed by plaintiffs deviated from the repair estimates submitted
to and accepted by plaintiffs.
DATED this

15 ~ day of ^ V - K ^ . ^ ^ U

, 1988.

^z,A^J{
LEON MAXWELL
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / O y v day of

November

1988.
NOTARY PCIRF.TP
NOTARY
PUBLIC
Residing a t : ^ o i ^ c

<5

(

T

IAXJL-C&U-KH

My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

/ ^

day o f / ^ ^ M ,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leon

S21
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Maxwell was mailed, postage prepaid, to;
Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

S21-AFFID711/14/88nh
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG 6. HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
TED H. FISH

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. C87-7726
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,
Defendants.

j
,

Honorable James S. Sawaya

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, TED H. FISH, having been duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has been an employee of defendant State

Farm for approximately two years.
2.

Affiant served as a property damage estimator at the

State Farm Sandy Branch Office from January, 1987 until December,
1987.
3-

S21

Affiant knows of at least 30-40 repair estimates

A16

prepared by him which ultimately were serviced by plaintiffs'
shop.

As a result, affiant was required on numerous occasions to

visit plaintiffs' facility.
4.

Affiant on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs sub-

ject affiant's employer, State Farm, and plaintiffs1 supervisor,
Leon Maxwell, to verbal abuse and derision.
5.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," and that Mr. Maxwell
is a "bastard."
6.

Affiant has on numerous occasions requested that

plaintiffs cease from making verbal comments about his employer
and supervisors, but plaintiffs continue to make such remarks in
affiant's presence.
7.

On at least one occasion, during a dispute

concerning a repair estimate between affiant and plaintiff, Bryan
Christensen, affiant heard Mr. Christensen state, in effect,
"If I don't get it on this job, I'll get it on the next one."
8.

On several occasions, affiant has reinspected

vehicles repairs by various automobile body repair shops,
including plaintiffs', in Salt Lake County.
9.

Affiant is of the opinion that plaintiffs do "good"

work, but frequently deviate from the repair estimate without
informing affiant or State Farm.
10.

S21

Affiant has found plaintiffs very difficult to work

A17

with, and that plaintiffs' business practices resulted in affiant
spending far more time in handling claims with plaintiffs' shop
than with other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County.
11.

On numerous occasions, affiant reviewed the towing,

storage, and other incidental expenses charged by plaintiffs'
facility, and is of the opinion that such charges were unusual
and unreasonable, especially those charges on automobiles which
were eventually repaired by facilities other than plaintiffs'.
/S

DATED this

m day of

A/OI'E/MAT/3

1988.

TED H. FISH
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /OrK^ day of

NW&mbf.f-

. 1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC
O
Residing at: "SoJ^jr L^-kj? Coi>w<-^Y

My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby c e r t i f y that on t h i s

/jfi*

day of /favttcfaj

,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Ted H.

S21
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Fish was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall w. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE 6. ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

S21-AFFID311/8/88nh
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,
Defendants.

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
JEFFREY FINLEY

)
)
)
)

Civil No. C87-7726
Honorable James S. Sawaya

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, JEFFREY FINLEY, having been duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has been employed as an estimator for

defendant State Farm for approximately two and one-half years.
2.

During the course of affiant's employment with

State Farm, affiant has worked on approximately 24-30 claims with
plaintiffs.
3.

S21

Affiant has visited plaintiffs' shop in Murray,

A20

OOOIOG

Utah, on numerous occasions.
4.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell, is a "son of a
bitch" and a "bastard," and that State Farm and Mr. Maxwell are
attempting to "scare" the automobile body repair shops in the
Salt Lake Valley into keeping their prices low.
5.

On numerous occasions, affiant has been treated in

a discourteous manner by plaintiff's son, Jeff Christensen,
Mr. Christensen has frequently threatened to hold affiant ultimately responsible for the adequacy of repairs made by plaintiffs
to the vehicles of State Farm's insureds and claimants unless
State Farm agreed to pay more than the prevailling rate for
repairs.
6.

On at least one occasion, affiant has been con-

fronted by plaintiff's son, Jeff Christensen, about the pendency
of the instant action.

Mr. Christensen has subjected affiant to

verbal abuse and derision concerning defendants' and defendants1
attorneys' actions.
7.

Based upon affiant's experiences with the numerous

automobile body repair shops in the Salt Lake Valley, affiant
believes that plaintiffs are among the most difficult to deal with.
8.

Affiant has noted that he spends approximately

twice as much time in servicing claims handled through plaintiffs1
shop than with other automobile repair shops in Salt Lake County.

S21
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DATED this

day of

y]/^ ^4^^L-^

1988

,-<^t-^

NLEY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /„ ;/A—day of

Mwemke.r

1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC
^ > 7^
Residing at:Q>QJb ^ u L L P u ^ A f

My Commission Expires

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

I/ft* day of /l&WtoPl

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
Jeffrey Finley was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE 6. ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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GLENN C HANNI, #A-1327
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRIS P. SHIPLEY

Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

Civil No. C87-7726
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,

Honorable James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, CHRIS P. SHIPLEY, having been duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has been an employee of defendant State

Farm for approximately three and one-half years,
2.

Affiant is currently employed as an estimator by

State Farm and has rendered approximately 6,000 property damage
estimates on behalf of State Farm.
3.

S21

Affiant is aware of approximately 200 of his

A23

estimates that have had their repair work performed by plaintiffs,
4.

Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a frequent

basis, both on the telephone and in person at plaintiffs1 shop.
5.

On numerous occasions, affiant has heard plaintiffs

verbally abuse and deride affiant's employer, State Farm, and
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell.
6.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch" and a "bastard."
7.

On at least one occasion, affiant has heard plain-

tiff's son, Jeff Christensen, admit that plaintiffs have taken
unfair advantage of another insurance company.

Affiant heard

Mr. Christensen state that Farmers Insurance had refused to pay
for a certain repair, so plaintiffs "tacked" the cost of the
disputed repair onto the tow bill that was submitted to and paid
by Farmers.
8.

Based upon affiant's experience with plaintiffs and

other automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, affiant
is of the opinion that plaintiffs' charges for towing, storage,
and deposit fees are frequently both unusual and unreasonable.
9.

Affiant is aware of at least on one occasion when

plaintiffs required a State Farm insured or claimant to pay a
$300 non-refundable "deposit fee" before permitting an automobile
to be towed to another repair shop in order to obtain a
competitive bid.

S21

A24

10.

Based upon affiant's experience, affiant is of the

opinion that plaintiffs' facility requires far more supplemental
repair estimates than other shops located in Salt Lake County.
11.

Affiant is of the opinion that other shops perform

work of a higher quality than plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs'
repair charges are above the prevailing competitive rate in Salt
Lake County.
12.

As a result of plaintiffs' refusal to find State

Farm's estimates to be "acceptable," affiant and State Farm have
been required to implement a policy requiring its insureds and
claimants to obtain competitive bids from two or three other
repair shops before having repairs performed by plaintiffs.
13.

That the use of such a competitive bid system

requires far more work and expense on the part of affiant,
affiant's co-employees, and State Farm's insureds and claimants.
14.

Affiant was told on at least one occasion by plain-

tiff's son, Jeff Christensen, that plaintiffs would not permit
their competitors to enter their premises in order to obtain
competitive bids.
15.

Plaintiffs' refusal to allow their competitors on

the premises has resulted in great inconvenience and additional
expense to affiant.

S21

A25

/*?*

DATED this

day of

/Jcv^^tn^

, 1988.

CHRIS P. SHIPLEY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jf^-rk— day of

f\l B* ember

1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC
O
Residing at: S o ^ Lake Qc>-~^y

My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

/ ^

day

of/h&ipfa

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
Chris P. Shipley was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall w. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

S21-AFFID411/8/88nh
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GLENN C. HANNI, #A-13 27
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS* BODY & PAINT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN,
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT J. BORDEN

Plaintiffs,
vs.

;
Civil No. C87-7726

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and LEON MAXWELL,

)

Honorable James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, ROBERT J. BORDEN, having been duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has been employed by defendant State Farm

since 1978.
2.

Affiant is currently employed as a property claims

trainer and reinspector.

Prior to serving in that capacity, aff-

iant served as an estimator and claims representative.
3.

Affiant has dealt with plaintiffs on a nearly

S21
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weekly basis for the last two years.
4.

Affiant has reinspected hundreds of automobiles

repaired by automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
5.

Affiant has reinspected approximately 50 automo-

biles repaired by plaintiffs.
6.

Based upon these reinspections, affiant believes

that plaintiffs are more likely than other automobile body shops
in Salt Lake County to deviate from repair estimates.
7.

Affiant has observed on several occasions that

certain parts called for under the repair estimates have not been
placed on the repaired automobile by plaintiffs.
8.

During affiant's visit to plaintiffs1 shop, affiant

has been subjected to plaintiffs' verbal abuse and derision of
affiant's supervisor, Leon Maxwell.
9.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

state that Leon Maxwell is a "son of a bitch," that Mr. Maxwell
is a "unreasonable bastard," that Mr. Maxwell has a personal
vendetta against plaintiffs, and that State Farm "wants plaintiffs
to do a substandard job."
10.

Affiant has on numerous occasions heard plaintiffs

subject other State Farm employees to verbal abuse and derision.
11.

Affiant has found it very difficult to work with

plaintiffs on a reasonable basis, and affiant generally finds it
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distasteful and difficult to work with plaintiffs due to plaintiffs' conduct.
12.

Based upon affiant's experience with other

automobile body repair shops in Salt Lake County, affiant is of
the opinion that it takes him three to four times as much time
and effort to handle a claim through plaintiffs' facility than is
normally required at other shops.
13.

Based upon affiant's experience, affiant is of the

opinion that there are many other shops in Salt Lake County that
do better automobile body repair work than plaintiffs' shop.
DATED this

/&~

fioKfth-^

day of

, 1988.

#6h%uL^

ROBERT qX/BORDEN
Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s
KloVCfAkjr

[QTrv-day of

1988.

.oo^rn-

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing a t : <Sa\A-UtV(? dow-rjry

My Commission Expires
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Us
I hereby certify that on thi;

///*

day of /fa^mt^

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of
Robert J. Borden was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Randall W. Richards
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

S21-AFFID211/8/8 8nh
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STEPHEN J. TRAYNER, #4928
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-7080

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS1 BODY & PAINT, INC., a
Utah corporation and BRYAN
CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE
CO., and LEON MAXWELL,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF
LEON MAXWELL
Civil No. C87-7726
Judge James S. Sawaya

)

Affiant, Leon Maxwell, having first been duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

Affiant has worked for defendant, State Farm for

approximately Seventeen (17) years.
2.

Affiant has served as property claim superintendent

in the State of Utah for State Farm for approximately the
last six years.
3.

As part of affiant's duties at State Farm, affiant

regularly compiles and reviews reports summarizing the number
of claims reported to the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.
4.

In 1985, the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company had Sixty Nine Thousand Six hundred Eighty

Five (69,685) reported claims.
5.

In 1986, the Utah Division of State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company had Sixty Six Thousand Two Hundred Forty-seven
(66,247) reported claims.
6.

In 1987,

the Utah Division

of State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company had Sixty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fortyseven (65,847) reported claims.
7.

Based upon affiant1s knowledge and experience in the

automobile insurance claims business in the State of Utah,
affiant is knowledgeable of the various factors and variables
that influence the number of reported claims for State Farm
insureds and claimants.
8.

Based upon affiant's knowledge and experience in the

automobile insurance claims business in the State of Utah,
affiant is of the opinion that the decrease in the reported
number of claims from 1985, to 1987 for the Utah Division
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is principally
the result of mild winter conditions prevalent in the State
of Utah during that same time period.
9.

Affiant holds no ill will toward plaintiffs, nor

has affiant ever had the intent or purpose to run plaintiffs
out of the automobile body repair business in the State of
Utah.
DATED this

JC

day of

- i : •'<- [

— / '

LEON MAXWELL

A3 2

, 1989.

'

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the

)
:
)

ss.

day of

, 1987, personally

appeared before me Leon Maxwell, who duly acknowledged to me
that he

has read and signed the foregoing Amended Affidavit

of Leon Maxwell, for and the same are true and correct to
the best of his information, knowledge and belief.
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